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THE ALLOCATION OF JAMES RIVER LIVING MARINE RESOURCES 
INTRODUCTION 
Man has traditionally considered oceanic resources as infinite 
and conmon property. The philosophy supported by this concept 
is, "get what you can, before someone else does," the "Tragedy 
of the Commons." This is exploitation as opposed to management. 
The concept of resource management is to provide rewards, be 
they the social pleasure of catching or the economic profit 
of selling the captured resource, to as large a segment of the 
population as possible, over as long a period as possible. 
Management of living marine and estuarine resources is still 
a new endeavor, in spite of the age of the agencies. The 
ocean was not "managed" until 1976 with the passage of the 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 which gave 
the United States exclusive resburce jurisdiction from 3 
to 200 n. miles offshore. This act was the result df foreign 
and domestic fishing pressure on the stocks which brought 
subsequent pressure on the politicians who in return reacted 
by passing legislation. As the finite limit of the resource 
was reached the less able to compete (the American fisherman) 
used political power to equalize the balance of power thro~gh 
legislation and realized a greater share of the allocation. 
These problems of open ocean and shelf resource allocation, 
while complicated are dwarfed in comparison to the allocation 
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problems of coastal living resources that move freely across 
state boundaries, and are subjected to differing management 
regimes as they do so. The James River is a microcosm of the 
coastal Mid-Atlantic estuarine ecosystem, with all the 
attendent pressures on the resources. 
Allocation between man and resource 
The pressure on each finite.resource is directly proportional 
to the proximity of man. In an area such as the James River 
the living marine resource must share with man not only 
its own biomass, but its resource, the water it lives in, its 
. environment . 
The allocation of this riverine environment between man's uses 
and the River's inhabitants is often a socio-economic judgement 
by regulatory agencies, hut cts often as not, a political 
decision. Man competes both for space and the water. Once 
through cooling, marina '·s sewage pathogens, chlorination, 
purposeful or accidental discharges of oil, herbicides, 
pesticides and fertilizers all reduce the quality of the 
resources' environment. 
Allocation of resources between man 
Just as he does on the ocean, man sets against man in the 
James for allocation of the finite resource. Competition 
for access to the resources, living and min.eral is keen. 
Sand, gravel and oyster shell are three mineral resources that 
are vital to tidewater economy. Their stewardship, maintained 
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by the Virginia Marine Resources Commission, is often a 
difficult one as they must be allocated between those 
desiring to mine them from the state owned sub-aqueous lands. 
Not only is access to state owned subaqueous mineral resources 
a growing concern; but so to is access by the public to the 
shore. Ownership of the la~ds above the highwater mark, or 
vegetated wetlands, presupposes control of access. It is 
therefore possible to predict the eventuality of no public 
access to the shore except where Federal, State, or local 
government provide and maintain it at tax payers expense. Or, 
as at many such "public ownerships" a fee is charged. The 
beach may remain free, but not so the right-of-way. Today, 
however, I want to focus on the shellfish, the oyster and 
hard clam, on ownership of state river bottom, on how to 
harvest ~he resource, and on who is permitted to harvest it. 
Let us consider the three most controversial-areas. 
James River Seed Oyster 
Currently, 75% of the seed oyster in Virginia comes from the 
public oyster rocks in the lower James. State law currently 
allows their harvest by hand tong only. The tonger sells to 
a "buyboat" or trucker (broker) on shore, each man tonging 
50-100 bushels a day. These seed are sold to private planters 
to "plant" on their river leases. If the MRC wishes to 
\i., 
obtain seed from the James to rehabitate or replete depleted 
,.. 
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public oyster rock they must have the watermen obtain. the 
seed. Generally they pay an agreed upon sum per bushel and 
have the ~onged seed loaded on a leased or chartered boat 
(or truck) to transport to the selected public rock. 
The most economic procedure would be to harves: the seed by 
dredge, selling some to private lease holders and planting 
the rest on public bottom. This would lower the cost of 
seed, perhaps from $2.50/Bu to .60-.70/Bu. A third alternative 
is to make some of the less productive rocks or those too deep 
to tong available to private concerns so they can produce 
their own seed at a considerable saving. 
Studies have shown that the major loss in Virginia oyster 
production since 1960 has been from the private sector while 
constant. To rebuild the Virginia oyster industry then we 
need to make low cost seed·available to the private grower. 
But what will this reallocation do to the waterman, already 
hurt by Kepone and steady oyster prices during a period 
of raising operating costs. 
The decision is up. to the General Assembly. 
Unassigned bottom 
There are 2],841 acres of public oyster ground (Baylor Bottom) 
and about 15,000 acres of leased bottom in the James River. 
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In addition, there is large acrage of unassigned bottom, of this, 
some 20,000 acres are below the James River Bridge and produce 
hard clams. These higher salinity unassigned grounds with 
the oyster disease MSX that makes them unattractive to lease 
and grow out market oysters, are ideal hard clams. These 
unassigned grounds can be leased for hard clam harvest or even 
culture at $1. 50/ acre/year. They are currently worked 
by watermen using patent tongs. They are lost to the watermen 
when they are leased. Another alternative is to set them 
aside as "public clam grounds." The decision as to the allocation 
of these clam grounds is up to the MRC. Who will get what, 
and how much? Or, will the General Assembly be pressured, as 
it is now to stop the private leasing. 
The Hydraulic Dredge 
The question of leasing state bottom £or clam harvest is more 
comple:{ then simply who gets the use of the bottom. On 
Hampton Bar in the Lower James where.some 1,800 acres of 
"unassigned ground" were leased last fall and a permit issued 
to use a hydraulic escalator dredge for th·e taking of clams. This 
gear, which is seven times more efficient than the patent tong, 
was opposed by the watermen in mass at the MRC and in the 
halls of the General Assembly. 
Here the question of resource allocation raised a new 
consideration. Not who gets it, but how will he be allowed to 
take it. To keep the watermen competitive the lease holder 
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may not use his efficient dredge, he too must use the patent 
tong, or so Senate Bill 60 will stipulate. S. B. 60 will 
make illegal the use of the hydraulic dredge for the harvest 
of hard clams even on leased bottom. .A legislative aliocation 
from industry pressure. 
The Question 
The examples posed here do not answer the question of who 
receives the allocation nor who shall make them. It raises 
the larger question, how do we decide who get the resource? 
What shall our criterial be? Virginia's unwritten resource 
policy is legislation enforcing inefficiency of harvest by 
restricting new techniques thereby not harvesting above the 
maximum sustainable yield, but more importantly, not permitting 
efficient/effective harvest techniques to put anyone out of 
work. This policy insures the watermen an allocation of the 
finite resource. Othere states do not allocate shellfish 
resources among harvesters with the exception of Maryland 
and its sail powered Skipjack. The Skipjack, a sailboat 
can only, on certain days of the week, tow an oyster dredge 
while under sail. Can Virginia continue its policy of 
enforced inefficiency in an inflationary economy? Must we 
move to the more modern, efficient techniques, allowing 
increased production, but with the resultant erosion of the 
waterman. Can we afford not to, can we afford to. 
